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Chapter pages in book: (p. 48 - 51)million men in late spring 1946 when the labor force had returned to
peacetime proportions. As in Canada, the civilian sector was overdis-
banded. After 1946 the total labor force stayed above the prewar pro-
portion of population, unemployment was less than 4 percent of the
labor force, and the armed forces still retained over a million men.
During the 12 or 18 months after victory the labor force tended to
anticipate the precipitous flight from military service.
Very little can be discovered about the labor force demobilization of
Germany during the months following the defeat. Official enumerations
made in 1946 covering all four zones of occupied Germany, plus Berlin,
disclosed that the combined labor fprce proportion of population 14 and
older, standardized for age and sex, was 4 percent below the labor force
participation in the same areas in May 1939. (Wirtschaftswissenschaft-
liches Institut der Gewerkschaften, Deutschland in Zahien, 1950 [Köln,
1951] pp. 12-13, 31.) The fact, however, that this deficiency was much
larger than in the United States, Britain, or Canada could have been
due (a) to the postwar industrial disorganization of Germany, (b) to
the possession by Germans of far more money than they could spend,,
in view of the restricted quantity of goods offered at controlled prices, or
(c) to the taking of the census in late October, by which time the labor
force may have lost many agricultural helpers normally at work in May,
the month in which the prewar count was made.
8THE KOREAN WAR AND POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER EXPANSION
At the threshold of the Korean conflict, in April 1950, the labor force
contained 63.5 million workers42 of which 1.3 million were in the armed
The monthly figures for April 1940 through April 1951 are from Census Current
Population Surveys and rest on interviews with about 25,000 households. The accu-
racy of sample surveys is always suspect and the 1950 enumeration of the nation's
households does nothing to settle them, for a preliminary release, also resting on a
sample though a much larger one, reports 3.5 million fewer in the April 1950 labor
force on the basis of,the same concept and measurement technique (Series PC-i,
No. 2, April 11, 1951, pp. 1-2). The Census ascribed the cause of this paradoxical
discrepancy to the poor quality and inexperience of the 130,000 temporary inter-
viewers as well as their responsibility for questions on housing, income, and agricul-
ture. The Survey enumerators, in contrast, were a "small, well-trained group with,
on the average, more than 12 months of specialized experience in the enumeration
of the labor force.... Aswas the case a decade earlier, when the monthly survey
results were compared with the 1940 Decennial Census data, it appeared that the
more skilled interviewers had had greater success in handling the labor force ques-
tions for population groups whose activity is difficult to measure and, in consequence,
48forces (Table 12). By the end of the next 12 months, the armed forces
were nearly 3 million strong, and 1.2 million new workers and work
seekers had moved into the labor market. The rise in the labor force from
the population growth was a bit larger than in early World War II but
the additions in excess of the population growth were much smaller: a
half million, representing an increase in people's willingness to be in the
labor force. The ratio of the labor force to the armed force enlargement
was well under that in 1940-41 or 1941-42. Though there was as yet
no general labor shortage, stringencies were afflicting key occupations.
As defense orders take hold, there will be a great need for extra man-
power. What are the prospects for further expansion?
A paragraph of caution is directed at those who would use the World
War II experience to project employment and labor force increases
Table 12
Labor Force in Early Wartime by Employment and Military Status
Both Sexes, 14 and Older, United States, April
World War II Korean War
19411942 Change 19501951Change
A MILLIONS OF PERSONS
Labor force
(civilian & military) 56.358.8 2.5 63.564.7 1.2
Armed forces 1.3 2.9 1.6 1.3 2.9 1.6
Labor force (civilian) 55.055.9 0.9 62.261.8 —0.4
Unemployed 6.4 3.1 —3.3 3.5 1.8 —1.7
Employed 48.652.8 4.2 58.760.0 1.3
BPERCENTAGE OP POPULATION 14 AND OLDER
Labor force
(civilian & military) 55.056.8 1.8 56.657.1 0.5
Armed forces 1.3 2.8 1,5 1.2 2.6 1.4
Labor force (civilian) 53.754.0 0.3 55.454.5 —0.9
Unemployed 6.3 3.0 —3.3 3.1 1.6 —1.5
Employed 47.451.0 3.6 52.352.9 0.6
had obtained a more nearly complete count of persons who were employed or who
were looking for work. ... Bothgroups of enumerators obtained practically the same
results for employed males 25 years of age and over. .-
Skillfulsample surveys can, of course, be more accurate than hasty enumerations,
but it does not ease the mind to discover that the excess increased from 1,0 percent
in 1940 to nearly 6 percent in 1950, yielding a differential in April 1950 of nearly
5 percent or roughly 3 million. Either the Survey interviewers further improved their
quality or the measurement technique, when carried out faithfully, tends to drag in
increasing numbers of borderline workers. Though the same technique was applied
in the 1950 Census, it may not lend itself to the 'quickie' interviews of decennial
enumerators.
49during future wars.InApril 1951, following the Korean outbreak,
there were only a fourth as many unemployed as in April 1940, and
the labor force proportion was 3.0 percent of the population 14 and
older above that eleven years before. Of the reserves that might have
existed if pre-Worid War II conditions had been reproduced, 6.2 million
formerly unemployed and 3.4 million outside the labor force were pre-
sumably at work in April 1951. Nearly 10 million of the World War II
additions to civilian and military employment had thus already been
absorbed.
Nevertheless, prospects are now good for filling another 9 million jobs
in the event of a major war. About 3 million may be expected to come
into the labor force during the next four years from the new population.
Another 5 million might well enter if the armed forces were raised to a
maximum by calling up 9 million more men (on the basis of the 0.5 to
0.6 ratio of labor force to armed force increases that prevailed in the
later years of World War II). Still another million and a quarter civilian
employed would come from a fall of unemployment to the trough in
World War II.
With these potential reinforcements, the armed forces could add an-
other 9 million to its present 3 million without depressing civilian em-
ployment below the 60 million in April 1951. Lengthening the workweek
5 hours, fully practicable only under considerable strain, could supply
another 5 million equivalent workers. (The average person in non-
agricultural industries is now working the same number of hours as in
the spring before Pearl Harbor.) Essential employments could also get
more personnel by converting automobile plants to tank production and
•diverting domestic servants, bartenders, unproductive farm workers, and
the like, to munitions industries. However, too sharp a curtailment of
laundry, cleaning, catering, plumbing, painting, and other services
would add burdens to housework, so that fewer women and young
persons could work outside the home. An overlong workweek would de-
•press the hourly productivity of those employed43 and keep out of jobs
many women who must have time after work to shop and cook. Deple-
tion of high schools, colleges, and technical institutes for many years
would cut off future skilled workers and trained leaders. Consequently,
Hours of Work and Output, BLS Bulletin 917. Clarence D. Long, Manpower Needs
and the Labor Supply (American Enterprise Association, 4 East 41st St., New York,
Dec. 1951), pp. 28-30.
50in increasing the labor supply attention has to be given to keeping all
its parts in balance. The manpower, potential is far more fully utilized
than in 1940 and certain skills are already short. Still, in all-out war, 14
million equivalent fuiltime workers, a quarter of present employment,
might be added to military and civilian occupations.44 Reserves of this
relative size give an economy great flexibility. They surely exist in no
other land and, with them in prospect, the United States is entitled to
face a total mobilization with considerable confidence.
"Ibid., pp.15-24.
51